The Officer’s Three Names: the formal, familiar, and bureaucratic in the transnational history of scientific fellowships.

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Abstract
This chapter uses Rockefeller Foundation fellowship files and related documentation for mathematicians in Latin America (especially Uruguayan communist José Luis Massera) to examine the multifarious work of transnational scientific fellowship administration in the mid-twentieth century. It focuses on Harry Milton Miller, a long-serving and far-traveling officer of Rockefeller’s Division of Natural Sciences, and his formal, familiar, and bureaucratic postures that correspond (broadly speaking) with three distinct ways he affixed his name or was addressed in his correspondence and records. Tracking the officer’s three names elucidates the interactions among the variety of relationships and practices Miller created and sustained in support of the Rockefeller Foundation’s fellowship programs in the natural sciences. In particular, they help explain how officials navigated political and institutional obstacles to establish durable transnational scientific networks. Their adaptations and improvisations both directly and indirectly shaped a scientific elite that would dominate emerging transnational formations.

Keywords: fellowships, Rockefeller Foundation, mathematics, Latin America, bureaucracy

Introduction: Fragment from a Cocktail Party
The archives of the iconic organizations of transnational science in the twentieth century are padded thick with deskwork: forms, reports, accounts, letters, notes, and memoranda reposing for reference and posterity in neatly seriated files in row after orderly row of boxes and shelves. Most deskwork is terribly dull, a litany of i’s dotted and t’s crossed, testament to the meticulous, multi-layered patchwork of activity required to send money, people, and materials along with high ideals and sweeping enterprises across the globe. The officers and bureaucrats that made such deskwork hum did not live for paper, but paper is, for the most part, what the archival historian (also a creature of desks and paper) gets to see.

Occasionally, however, these archives serve up a glimpse of those parts of organizational life that extend beyond paper and deskwork. Such irruptions can, in turn, help one read the rest of the archive differently. Emissaries from another idiom—one ever-present in these organizations but largely missing in their archives—records of non-deskwork can emphasize different values, relationships, manners, and practices. This holds all the more if that non-deskwork took place at a cocktail party.

In June, 1957, the Rockefeller Foundation celebrated the 62nd birthday and (more to the point) the 25th year of service of Dr. Harry Milton Miller, Jr. in a gathering charged with cocktail-fueled reminiscences. The party’s archival record takes the form of remarks offered by the foundation’s high-profile science officer Warren Weaver, who attempted to indicate “a small fragment of that quarter century of [Miller’s] remarkable service” and committed his remarks to writing for inclusion in the foundation’s newsletter.1 There was, indeed, much to cover. Born in

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1 Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, New York, Rockefeller Foundation Archives (hereafter RF), Biographical File (FA485), box 5, “Miller, Harry M., Jr.” folder, Weaver remarks for newsletter, 1957 (hereafter Weaver Miller remarks). I thank Margaret Hogan of the Rockefeller Archive Center for
Baltimore and educated in the American mid-west—completing a Ph.D. in parasitology from the University of Illinois after a year and a half of service in the medical corps in France during the Great War—Miller was then nearing the end of a career with the Rockefeller Foundation that would span 28 years (plus one month). Through wide-ranging travels and far-reaching networks of intelligencing and administration, he brokered the foundation’s international fellowship programs in the natural sciences during a pivotal period in its history, marked by an expansive ambition toward and epoch-defining effect on transnational science.

“Dusty Miller (or Associate Director H. M. Miller, Jr., if you insist on being formal) joined the RF staff on June 1, 1932,” Weaver began. His chummy overture suggests a basic insight into how Miller and the Rockefeller Foundation worked, which shall guide this chapter. Neither Weaver nor Miller put much stock in artificial formality, but they both knew the places and uses of being formal. Look at Miller’s paper traces as he moved young men of science across the globe and you find a triple presence: the officer’s three names. There is Dusty Miller, the gregarious globetrotter who quickly won affection wherever he went. There is the rigorous official Dr. Harry Miller, or Associate Director H. M. Miller, Jr. (as Weaver put it), agent of a philanthropic titan with worldwide ambitions. These two sides of Miller dominated Weaver’s remarks, for instance in his recollection that Miller “never made a visit without leaving behind him friendship and respect”: the comraderie of Dusty and the dignity of Dr. Miller.

Just as important was a third name, omitted by Weaver: the “HMM” who peppers notices and memoranda and who annotates reports as they travel through the Rockefeller Foundation’s churning bureaucratic underbelly. What I shall call Miller’s “bureaunym,” a two- or three-letter name Rockefeller staff at all levels from typist to President deployed in internal communications, marks out the institutional connective tissue that underwrote and bound together Dusty’s friendships and Miller’s executive wherewithal alike. Each name represents a different way of moving through and intervening in the world of transnational science. Different, but not disjoint: each side of Miller’s selectively splintered subjective posture interacts with the others, and the shifts and exchanges among Miller’s names say as much about his work as those names’ contextual and operational distinctions. Miller was hardly unique in this regard, and his three names indicate a broadly applicable way of reading the personal and bureaucratic work behind science’s transnational institutional architecture at mid-century.

Administrators in philanthropic, governmental, and academic institutions combined formal communications and inquiries with extensive informal travel and relationship-building. They bound these channels of formal and informal communication together by intensively collecting, archiving, and cross-referencing reports, logs, diaries, and evaluations. One subjective posture rarely sufficed for long: “Dusty” received informal news, which he matched to reports annotated by “HMM,” prompting formal inquiries by “Dr. Miller,” abetted by Dusty’s backchannel maneuvers and tracked in HMM’s internal notes and observations.

 locating and sending me this file. I have reconstructed Miller’s employment history from this file and from his listed positions in the Rockefeller Foundation annual reports, online at rockefellerfoundation.org.  

Following Miller’s names gives purchase to the multifarious forms of border crossing deployed and promoted by Rockefeller Foundation officers and their counterparts in related organizations. These officers sent both people and documents across borders, navigating social, political, and institutional constraints and relationships through personal contact in diverse venues and media. Efforts to circulate bodies depended integrally on efforts to circulate papers, and vice versa. Miller’s names index that circulation, as the inscribed records of his personal circulation and the means by which he projected his administrative presence across considerable distances through post, telegram, and other means.

I have come to know Miller’s three names through my research into the mid-century emergence of an intercontinental mathematical discipline, defined by exchanges of people and texts across multiple continents as an established feature of scholarly practice. Mathematics was always a small part of Miller’s fellowship portfolio, confined mostly to the decade and a half beginning in 1940 when the Rockefeller Foundation pivoted from a war-engulfed Europe to the comparatively tranquil frontier of Latin America for its interventions in science and medicine. Starting with the two leading mathematicians of Uruguay—Rafael Laguardia and José Luis Massera—and reaching to Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, Miller shepherded a small Latin American mathematical elite through further training in the United States. Along the way, the peripatetic parasitologist helped lay the bureaucratic formations that joined Latin America to a newly integrated global community of mathematicians.

Miller and the Rockefeller Foundation worked amidst a tangled network of private, governmental, and transnational bodies to assess and intervene in the developing world’s scientific institutions. Fellowship programs like those of the Rockefeller and Guggenheim Foundations found common cause with, for example, the technical assistance programs of the new postwar United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). I have elsewhere elaborated this process in connection with the itineraries of two of Miller’s South American charges, Uruguay’s Massera and Brazil’s Leopoldo Nachbin, showing how mathematical institution-building in the early Cold War rested integrally on the assessment and circulation of people—a pair of activities at which Miller was especially adept. Revisiting those files—and selected others—from the perspective of Miller’s multiple names shows how the Rockefeller officer mixed subjective postures through paper and personal relations to establish cross-border connections amidst a variety of obstacles. In Miller’s three names, we glimpse the plural foundation of transnational science, the layered informal, formal, and bureaucratic voices and selves that put certain forms of transnational exchange at the center of a vast reconfiguration of science in the mid-twentieth century.

Hearts and Ping Pong
Miller earned his stripes in fellowship administration in the Rockefeller Foundation’s interwar Paris office, which Weaver portrayed as a site of frenetic network-building punctuated by lunchtime card games and evening table sports. “We were young then,” he explained, “and very full of beans.” Weaver insisted that the Paris office “worked even harder than we played” and

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was not “all hearts and ping pong.” But hearts and ping pong is not so bad a description of the interwar practice that eventually underwrote the Rockefeller Foundation’s postwar fellowship programs, especially in less resource-intensive fields like mathematics. Foundation officers bounced from site to site, collecting information on who held what cards (people, resources, needs, and priorities), winning useful friendships as they went.

The Paris office became the lynchpin of the Rockefeller Foundation’s transatlantic efforts through a range of interventions under the International Education Board in the 1920s, which gave the Foundation a foothold in Europe. IEB officers aimed to rebuild war-devastated European institutions on an American model featuring inter-institution competition, mobility for junior scholars, and entrepreneurial elitism. The Foundation would attempt the same, under somewhat different conditions and with new political and ideological motivations, after World War II. Between the wars, the IEB focused on establishing or reinforcing centralized institutions—for mathematics, most notably in Paris and Göttingen—and on supporting programs of travel and exchange that allowed junior scholars to circulate within Europe to benefit from such concentrations of resources and expertise.

IEB officers established a pattern of intelligencing that Miller learned in the Paris office of the Foundation’s Division of Natural Sciences, which took over many of the IEB’s activities in the sciences in the 1930s. Such intelligencing took three forms. First, officers built relationships and sought systematic knowledge of their domains of intervention through grand tours, exemplified for the IEB in a 1923-1924 19-country circuit by Wickliffe Rose, the Board’s first president. Rose generated a steady stream of reports on local institutional conditions and on authority figures who could help broker exchanges and provide their own expert assessments in the future. At the same time, with an eye toward developing scientific personnel, he noted promising younger scholars along with their research and training conditions, employment prospects, and related considerations.

While Rockefeller officers generally had advanced scientific training, the most relevant parts of that training for their Rockefeller work concerned the culture, sociability, and institutional organization of science, rather than any specific topical knowledge. Miller, for his part, was well aware of how little his scientific background prepared him to evaluate mathematicians, remarking of José Luis Massera’s candidacy that he was “certainly in no position to judge [the proposal] on the technical side.” Officers consulted scientific experts in place of cultivating specialist knowledge of their own. This vastly expanded the number of research areas to which the foundation could direct resources while helping officers champion new or emerging fields. The approach tended to concentrate intellectual authority in those well-placed, often charismatic individuals who possessed the most institutional authority, and who

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5 Weaver Miller remarks.
7 John Krige, American Hegemony and the Postwar Reconstruction of Science in Europe (Cambridge, 2006), ch. 4.
8 See Siegmund-Schultze, Rockefeller, ch. 2.
9 Archivo General de la Universidad de la República, Montevideo, Archivo Privado José Luis Massera, folder 5A, Miller to Massera, 16 Apr 1947.
were best positioned to guide the foundation’s evaluations of unproven researchers and topics. Such relationships with established experts constituted the other two primary kinds of Rockefeller intelligencing.

The first of these came from amplifying chance encounters, using an influx of resources to turn modest ventures into more ambitious ones. When the dean of American mathematics, Harvard’s George David Birkhoff, planned to make his very first trip to Europe in 1926, he requested a thousand dollars of supplemental support from the IEB in exchange for a detailed report on conditions in the countries on his itinerary. Birkhoff shared his expert opinion on who the leaders were in each locale, where investments might be profitably directed, and other topics of interest to the Board. Despite his robust correspondence with European mathematicians (by the standards of his period), he was surprised by many aspects of the situation on the ground, and his expert observations extended to topics like sabbatical leave policies that had not occurred to IEB officials in their own inquiries.

Where bureaucratic or expert grand tours were not forthcoming, the IEB made do with the assembled expertise of those nearer to hand. Any mathematician passing through New York and known to the Foundation could count on an invitation to stop by the Rockefeller Foundation offices and to have notes from any conversations typed and filed. Correspondence with those the Foundation identified as leaders of the field gave rise to thick dossiers of tables, lists, maps, and reports. Rose’s IEB practice turned on using his formal position to establish informal advisory relationships, transforming those informal relationships selectively into formal ones for producing administrative data, and transmuting those data through bureaucratic practice into formats that could guide projects. This triple practice, which Miller would learn in Rockefeller’s Paris office and would come to reflect in his three names, drew on the social and institutional norms of academic research and of philanthropy. The outcome was not entirely of either world, but as philanthropic involvement in transnational science grew in scale and significance an important segment of academic practice came to conform to this hybrid approach to intelligencing and intervening.

When Europe descended once more into war, the Rockefeller Foundation withdrew from what had hitherto been their primary base of operation abroad. Miller and Weaver’s Division of Natural Sciences, as well as the International Health Division (which Rose had launched before moving on to spearhead the IEB), redeployed personnel and resources from Europe across the American hemisphere, in part toward the American war effort (including preparations for war before the United States’ formal entry into the conflict) and in part toward what Weaver termed “a friendly invasion of Latin America.” Rockefeller officials latched onto the latter theater as

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10 Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, New York, International Education Board Archives (hereafter IEB), series 1, box 12, folder 171, Birkhoff to Rose, 12 May 1925. Further documentation for the trip is in this same folder. Rockefeller also underwrote bilateral exchanges, e.g. the reciprocal visits of G.H. Hardy (Oxford) and Oswald Veblen (Princeton) documented in Rockefeller Archive Center, IEB, series 1, box 17 folder 247.
11 E.g. IEB, series 1, box 12, folder 171, Trowbridge to Rose, 1 Oct 1926, discussing Birkhoff’s report.
12 E.g. IEB, series 1, box 8, folder 110.
13 Weaver Miller remarks. Some Rockefeller engagements in the region, particularly in connection with the International Health Division, predated Weaver’s “friendly invasion.” A key example was the foundation’s role in the 1934 establishment of the Universidade de São Paulo. See Maria Gabriela S. M. C. Marinho, Norte-americanos no Brasil: uma História da Fundação Rockefeller na Universidade de São Paulo, 1934-1952 (Brança Paulista, 2001). On Miller’s later ties to USP, leading to an honorary degree
an outgrowth of a burgeoning turn to hemispherism among American scholars, businesspeople, and policymakers in the twentieth-century. Most immediately identified with U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt’s “good neighbor” policy of interamerican hegemony, the foundation’s interest in Latin American science and mathematics derived more from an ideal of cultural exchange and solidarity than from previously dominant motives to understand the region as such. There did not need to be a place-specific reason to do mathematics in South America in order to justify its inclusion in Rockefeller programs—that mathematics was an important part of American scholarship was reason enough. Just as American interventions in Europe presumed a fundamental commonality as the basis for navigating differences, later Latin American programs took a basic homology between respective societies and scientific institutions for granted.

That presumed homology shaped everything from grand programmatic ideals to routine aspects of administration. Each form of intelligencing just identified with the IEB in Europe thus found a parallel in Latin America. The translation extended across formal and informal aspects of officers’ work, even to the drinks that lubricated long evenings on the road. As Weaver recalled at the 1957 cocktail party, he and Miller were certainly acquainted with “the marvelous tranquilizing power of triple Pisco Sours,” a potent Andean cocktail.

Scientific experts, too, proved portable. George Birkhoff, for one, followed his interwar European tour with a 1942 passage through Mexico, Peru, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay—sponsored by the U.S. Office of Inter-American Affairs rather than the Rockefeller Foundation. Birkhoff’s former student Marshall Stone made an OIAA tour of his own the next year to Peru, Bolivia, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Brazil. The Rockefeller Foundation obtained Stone’s OIAA report, in turn, through its role as a principal sponsor of the American Mathematical Society’s War Policy Committee, which Stone chaired. Miller’s annotations, tagged “HMM,” show that Stone’s report provided important background for the first mathematical fellowships under Miller’s watch.

The very first such fellowship went to Rafael Laguardia of Montevideo, Uruguay, who studied at Harvard. His fellowship was successful but unremarkable, and as a consequence left little direct paper trail. It success is attested indirectly, through the many and lasting correspondence relationships he was able to establish with mathematicians at Harvard and elsewhere in the American North-east, which helped him to become a significant participant in a variety of postwar international mathematical formations. A meticulous self-archiver, the only

in 1951, see ibid., ch. 4. The Guggenheime Foundation’s Latin America program also began before the outbreak of World War II, but expanded significantly in 1940.

14 See Ricardo D. Salvatore, Disciplinary Conquest: U.S. Scholars in South America, 1900-1945 (Durham, 2016).

15 This presumed homology was fundamental to asymmetric, hegemonic aspects of the respective interventions, not just those aspects considered placeless or universal. I discuss this phenomenon under the rubric of mathematical and scientific colonialism in Barany, “Traveling Fellows,” 674-681.


records he retained of the fellowship itself were a generic pamphlet the foundation gave to each fellow and a packing list showing that he shipped a trunk with 100 pounds of personal effects and books.  

The Rockefeller Foundation’s own dossier for Laguardia is comparably slim (likely purged as having nothing of lasting administrative consequence). It contains only two application forms, dated respectively 27 October, 1941 and 20 November, 1943. The first explained that Laguardia had studied in Paris in 1928, a time when the Rockefeller Foundation was deeply involved in Paris mathematics, and proposed to visit the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey. That proposal went unrealized, but his second application—marked as read by “HMM” in February, 1944—notes that the foundation was then funding Laguardia’s international study closer to home, in Rosario, Argentina. There, he worked with Italian mathematician Beppo Levi and Spanish mathematician Luis Santaló, both of whom had migrated to Argentina to escape European fascism, as well as Argentine statistician Carlos Dieulefait. Once in the Rockefeller orbit, one tended to remain there, and so it is not surprising that the second application led to a fellowship at Harvard, although few traces of its precise details remain.

Another early Rockefeller mathematics fellow, Guillermo Torres Diaz of Mexico, left a more complete paper trail in the Rockefeller archives that shows the kinds of correspondence required of straightforward fellowships. Torres began pursuing his Ph.D. at Princeton, advised by Solomon Lefschetz, under a fellowship from the U.S. State Department between the Fall term of 1947 and the Spring term of 1949. Nearing the end of his State Department fellowship, he applied to the Rockefeller Foundation in order to be able to complete his degree, a task that according to an “HMM” annotation on his application form would be feasible with a further nine months of Rockefeller funding. A handful of letters from Lefschetz furnished “Dr. Miller” with a glowing assessment of the candidate and several pertinent points of background information, especially pertaining to the candidate’s circumstances at Princeton. “HMM” annotated these letters with further details and evaluations, and the file also includes reports labeled “HMM” of Miller’s personal meetings with Lefschetz in 1949 and Torres in 1950. The latter note records Miller’s discussion with Torres about possible modifications to his fellowship that might allow him to attend the 1950 International Congress of Mathematicians, which took place in Cambridge Massachusetts a few months past the planned end of his Rockefeller support. As a general rule, formal information flowed on paper to “Dr. Miller,” and “HMM” integrated it into his fellowship apparatus along with gleanings from personal conversations.

Deseos de Perfeccionar
Laguardia’s Montevideo colleague José Luis Massera had a much more difficult time than Laguardia did, and so left a paper trail that shows Miller’s bureaucratic process in much greater detail. I have elsewhere elaborated on these difficulties, which ranged from transiting in wartime to finding a suitable supervisor to navigating diplomatic and FBI objections to his Communist

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19 Archivo General de la Universidad de la República, Montevideo, Archivo Privado Rafael Laguardia (hereafter Laguardia Papers), box 5, folder 10.
20 RF, Record Group 10.1, series 337E, box 219, folder “Laguardia Carle, Rafael.”
21 RF, Record Group 10.1, series 323E, box 88, folder “Torres Diaz, Guillermo.”
politics, with their numerous mathematical and political contexts and consequences.\textsuperscript{22} Despite many complications, Massera’s fellowship was ultimately quite successful by the Rockefeller Foundation’s standards. It connected him to prominent researchers in the United States, leading to lasting ties through correspondence, publication, and other professional activities. Here, I shall revisit Massera’s Rockefeller dossier in order to catalogue the many different kinds of personal and administrative relationships Miller cultivated and called upon in order to make the fellowship succeed.

Massera’s Rockefeller paper trail begins with Stone’s April 1944 OIAA report, filed with other documents from Stone’s War Policy Committee. Early in the letter, Stone complained that South America’s “political and geographical divisions” made it difficult for intellectual elites to cross borders in the continent for training and work—a circumstance Stone hoped the Rockefeller Foundation could remedy by promoting intracontinental exchanges in addition to bilateral exchanges with the United States. Miller here noted in red (as “HMM”) that Laguardia had gone from Uruguay to Argentina under the sort of arrangement Stone proposed. For a variety of institutional reasons, Stone recommended initially focusing on sending Latin American mathematicians to train in the United States, rather than sending U.S. mathematicians south to influence faculties there. Stone assessed the state of mathematics instruction and research, noting, for instance, that Argentina’s Julio Rey Pastor “has a very wide knowledge of mathematics and great gifts as an expositor” but “does not seem to have a gift for organizing and promoting the group interest of mathematicians.”

Of Montevideo’s mathematicians, Stone noted that Laguardia was then at Harvard (with Rockefeller support) and “Associated with him is Professor Massera.” He observed that “Both men are under forty, have very pronounced mathematical interests, excellent training, and good judgment about their problems,” and added some further remarks about their potential as researchers. Later in the letter, Stone included Massera on a list of six mathematicians whom he considered priorities for fellowships in the United States.

Stone’s letter helped establish Massera’s credibility as a fellowship candidate, but it was not sufficient to initiate his candidacy. However Stone did not just visit and report on South American institutions. He also spoke with mathematicians there about the United States and opportunities (including those supported by the Rockefeller Foundation) for American training. Such conversations gave ambitious young scholars ample opportunity to learn about potential fellowships, both directly and indirectly. They had comparatively less information about how to solicit such fellowships, and so the personal contacts Miller and his colleagues established in the region played a secondary role in connecting prospective fellows to fellowship programs. Walter S. Hill, an Uruguayan professor of engineering and physics in Montevideo described by one visitor from the United States as “a local big shot,”\textsuperscript{23} played that role for Massera, contacting Miller directly and also furnishing Massera with Miller’s contact information.


\textsuperscript{23} Archives of American Mathematics, Dolph Briscoe Center for American History, University of Texas at Austin, Paul R. Halmos Papers, box 4La74, “Uruguay” folder (hereafter Halmos Uruguay file), Halmos to Stone, 15 Nov 1951.
Hill’s letter reached Miller first, and was initially filed with other correspondence involving Montevideo physicists. Massera himself wrote a few days later, and an English translation of Massera’s letter along with a typed transcript of the portion of Hill’s letter concerning Massera formed the seed for the latter’s Rockefeller fellowship dossier. (Though Miller was, according to Weaver’s recollections, fluent in Spanish, Portuguese, and French, his annotations show that he worked with Spanish correspondence primarily in English translation arranged by Rockefeller staff.) The recommendation from Hill was brief. He described Massera as “a young man of exceptional talent and background” who was “a brilliant student” with “great aptitude for teaching.” Massera himself wrote at greater length, describing his research and expressing “mis deseos de perfeccionar mis conocimientos.” The translator rendered this as “my desire to broaden my knowledge,” though the Spanish more precisely indicates what Massera sought: perfeccionar typically connotes training and development and conocimientos indicates familiarity and understanding beyond just factual knowledge. Significantly, the translation and its reception show that Massera vastly overestimated Rockefeller Foundation officials’ interest in the specifics of his research and their capacity to understand it. He offered to send reprints and referred to publications and terminology which the translator’s skewed renderings show were unfamiliar, and which did not elicit comment from Miller.

Instead, Miller noted several points of missing information that for him were much more relevant. After receiving Massera’s translated letter, Miller wrote to Hill to ask for information about Massera’s marital and employment status, and specifically whether he had a wife who would expect to join him in the United States and whether he could expect to return to a full time position at the conclusion of a fellowship. The latter was a crucial point for prospective fellows, emphasized as well in Laguardia’s paperwork, as the foundation aimed to support those who already had a firm footing in their local academic institutions and could thus use their fellowship experience and training immediately to improve those institutions. Miller also referred to his own upcoming visit to Uruguay and his intention to meet with Massera (as well as Hill and other local contacts) in person. As he had in Europe, Miller continued to use such trips to make and reinforce personal connections that could be carried on by post from Rockefeller headquarters in New York.

Miller did not, however, wait for Hill (or, for that matter, Massera) to supply the missing information. The same day he wrote to Hill he also wrote to Laguardia, referring to “our friend Walter Hill” and requesting the same details on the hope of being able to offer a preliminary assessment of Massera’s fellowship prospects before traveling to Uruguay. The precaution of writing to Laguardia proved unnecessary, as Hill shared Miller’s inquiries directly with Massera, who himself wrote in short order to Miller with detailed answers. On the question of full-time employment, Massera explained that “in this country we have no clear idea of the exact meaning of this expression” and described his teaching and academic schedule as well as his regular political activities. He explained as well that he was married, and wondered if his wife (an artist) might accompany him “not as a companion but as a fellow of the Rockefeller Foundation.” Massera also arranged for the Dean of the Faculty of Engineering to write Miller a letter of

24 RF, Record Group 10.1, series 337E, box 56, “Massera, Jose Luis” folder (hereafter RF Massera), Hill to Miller, 15 May 1944.
25 RF Massera, Massera to Miller, 19 May 1944, with translation completed by “BTR” on 1 June 1944.
26 RF Massera, Miller to Hill, 2 June 1944.
27 RF Massera, Miller to Laguardia, 2 June 1944.
28 RF Massera, Massera to Miller, 15 June 1944, with translation completed by BTR on 28 June 1944.
support. Laguardia, too, replied to Miller’s request for information, commenting on Massera’s family situation, employment status, and political inclinations.

For Massera’s formal application, medical examination, and associated screening and paperwork, Miller turned to the nearest Rockefeller officials based in the area: L. W. Hackett and C. W. Wells of the International Health Division, in Buenos Aires. Wells, on their behalf, conveyed Massera’s health records and commented on his itinerary and visa application, which appeared routine. Massera followed up with Miller shortly thereafter to elaborate on his logistical arrangements and academic plans, enclosing a copy of a letter from his prospective supervisor at Stanford. Miller replied to Wells to make sure Massera’s itinerary included stopovers in the appropriate mathematical centers of South America along his intended route and emphasized the importance of pursuing Massera’s visa with the consulate in Montevideo. In April 1945, as Massera’s visa case soured, Miller returned to his archival copy of this letter and annotated it with references to Wells’s official diary and its November entries regarding assurances he had obtained regarding the visa.

But that is getting ahead of ourselves. At this stage, when Massera’s fellowship appeared routine, Miller alternated principally between “HMM”—the assembler and annotator of background information from the Rockefeller paper mill—and “Dr. Miller,” “Mr. Miller,” or “H. H. Miller, Jr.”—the comparatively formal officer corresponding with Foundation contacts in an official capacity. Though the salutations and signatures from his Hill and Laguardia correspondence do not appear in the excerpts in Massera’s file, Miller likely took an approach closer to the informal “Dusty” in his informal information-gathering with these informants. The formal mechanics of the fellowship coordinated by “Dr. Miller” here rested upon work as “HMM” and “Dusty” to establish Massera’s viability as a candidate and anticipate upcoming needs. Miller’s paper trail is so long and rich in part because “HMM” and “Dusty” fell somewhat short in this latter task, leaving Miller with a series of conundrums whose resolution would require resorting to all three subjective postures.

A Visa Difficulty
During November and December of 1944, Miller continued his correspondence with Massera over the academic details of his fellowship, with Magi over Massera’s institutional situation at home, and with Wells over the visa and other required hurdles. A 5 December letter from Wells sparked a flurry of discussion at Rockefeller headquarters by noting that Massera’s hitherto unspecified political activities included a leading position in the local communist party. As the letter was passed around and its contents discussed, officials in New York added their initials to the document and annotated it with new developments.

Here, the significance of a relatively anodyne letter to “Mr. Miller” came out only after churning through Rockefeller backrooms under the sign of “HMM” and other bureauanyms. A note that appears to be in Miller’s hand asks (apparently to Division of Natural Sciences Associate Director Frank Blair Hanson) “what is your reaction?” and elicited a penciled response that the foundation did not bother about a fellow’s political affiliation “except as they affect the

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29 RF Massera, Magi to Miller, 22 June 1944, with English translation (likely 11 July 1944).
30 RF Massera, Laguardia to Miller, 2 July 1944.
31 RF Massera, Wells to Miller, 20 October 1944.
32 RF Massera, Massera to Miller, 30 October 1944, trans. MLS 17 November 1944.
33 RF Massera, Miller to Wells, 3 November 1944.
34 RF Massera, Wells to Miller, 5 December 1944.
fellow’s future in his own country.” (Massera’s communism would, indeed, famously land him in prison in his own country, though that might have been hard to predict late in 1944.) Another note, also apparently in Miller’s hand, records that the “Communist aspect [was] cleared with TBA,” the bureaunym of Rockefeller Foundation Vice President Thomas B. Appleget. As the letter and annotations made clear, Massera’s communism was recognized as an annoyance but not considered a barrier to his fellowship.

This kind of assessment was relatively unremarkable for the Rockefeller Foundation in the mid-1940s. Notes about São Paulo’s Omar Catunda, whom Miller (as “HMM”) would describe in a 1950 note as a “rabid Communist,” focused more in 1946-47 on his relatively advanced age, his weak command of English, and his (rather more favorable) qualities as a mathematician. Indeed, his age so dominated Rockefeller discussions that his politics are hard to discern in his initial batch of documentation. One would expect Catunda’s politics to become more notable for American officials between 1947 and 1950, a period of rapid intensification in official American anticommunism. But the seemingly complete lack of Rockefeller concern for his politics at the start of this period nonetheless signals how far those like Miller were able to remove themselves from the period’s anxieties and suspicions over communist ideology.

At Wells’s urging, a counselor from the U.S. Embassy in Montevideo wrote to Miller on 4 January, 1945, to advise him that the embassy was prepared to grant Massera a visa and that he should follow up with the State Department in Washington, D.C. Lewis Hackett of the International Health Division returned to the Buenos Aires office in mid-January and wrote a personal note to “Dusty” to advise of his plans to visit Montevideo with Wells and to joke that Miller had better warn the people at Stanford of Massera’s communism, lest he “try to convert” them. Addressing his letter to “Dusty” allowed Hackett to switch registers, to share a joke, and to commiserate outside of their formal exchanges regarding administrative details of the fellowship. After the Montevideo trip, Wells updated “Mr. Miller” on Massera’s itinerary and medical examinations. All appeared to be progressing easily enough, under the circumstances.

Then, in March, a State Department official in Washington wrote a confidential letter to “Dusty” to explain that Massera’s communism had indeed prevented a visa from being issued. Note, here, both that Miller was on sufficiently familiar terms with someone in the State Department to receive such a notice with his nickname in the salutation, and that this familiarity did not help Miller to avert an embarrassing misreading of Massera’s prospects for a visa. In accordance with the State Department’s advice, the Rockefeller Foundation canceled the fellowship offer in April. An internal foundation memorandum that month, signed “HMM,” showed a series of discussions, with Rockefeller officials (including Miller) expressing umbrage to their State Department counterparts and pressing for a resolution. One possibility they considered was admitting Massera with partial FBI surveillance, and this became the U.S. government’s course of action after protracted negotiations. Wells continued as the Foundation’s

35 RF, Record Group 10.1, series 305E, box 20, “Catunda, Omar” folder.
36 RF Massera, Sparks to Miller, 4 January 1945.
37 RF Massera, Hackett to Miller, 23 January 1945.
38 RF Massera, Wells to Miller, 8 February 1945.
39 RF Massera, Pierson to Miller, 7 March 1945.
40 RF Massera, Inter-Office Correspondence, 27 April 1945; see also the handwritten note by “HMM” dated 30 November, 1945, beneath Inter-Office Correspondence of 29 November, 1945. As Miller was the first recipient of the Inter-Office document, his amendment became part of the record for its other readers.
point person with the Montevideo Embassy, and corresponded with “Mr.” or “Dr.” Miller about new developments. In the meantime, the Foundation resolved to wait for an affirmative assurance from the State Department before resuming fellowship plans on Massera’s behalf.

Their patience paid off at the start of January, 1946, when the Cultural Attaché at the Montevideo Embassy telephoned Wells to inform him that the U.S. Attorney General had granted Massera permission to study mathematics at an institution selected by the Rockefeller Foundation. Here, the foundation’s established reputation among U.S. government agents as a reputable and apolitical broker of international scientific exchanges—a reputation forged through extensive interwar and (especially) wartime contacts in both formal and informal contexts—left room for officials at the very top of the American immigration bureaucracy to delegate to the foundation the prerogative of guaranteeing an outspoken communist’s legitimate scientific intentions. Wells informed Miller and set the gears in motion for Massera’s prospective departure. The State Department confirmed the development to “Dr. Miller” in March, and Miller, Massera, and Wells then resumed contact in a formal register with academics in Montevideo and Stanford to revise his itinerary and make logistical arrangements. Miller returned to Montevideo as part of a South American tour in October 1946 and reported, to his frustration, that Massera’s political activity—which now included running for the Uruguayan Congress as a Communist—continued to make his travel precarious: “Embassy officials […] feel that they will be damned if they do issue the visa and damned if they do not.” To flag the observation for discussion within the Rockefeller bureaucracy, addressing the matter to Warren Weaver, Miller annotated it “To discuss with WW – HMM.”

The same Embassy visit that furnished Miller with that bit of intelligence, however, also gave him a means to act. He telegraphed his Embassy contact on 2 December and was able to secure a letter dated 4 December assuring him that Massera would be granted a visa in the end, though the letter’s transmission required a further telephone inquiry to a State Department contact in Washington. Massera was on his way to Stanford by March.

Contacts and Reverberations
Miller’s work did not end with Massera’s departure, however. Wherever possible, he attempted to meet with Massera and record a note for his Rockefeller file when they crossed paths—whether in transit through Central America or once situated in California. The Federal Bureau of Investigation made regular contact with Miller, in his capacity as “Dr. Harry M. Miller,” after taking an interest in Massera’s case early in 1947. Interpolating from attributed comments, it is likely that Miller was the Bureau’s anonymized “Source K” of inside information from the Rockefeller Foundation regarding Massera, noting in particular “that the foundation was aware of MASSERA’s Communist background but that the fellowship had been granted solely because

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41 RF Massera, Wells to Miller, 3 January 1946.
42 RF Massera, Pierson to Miller, 4 March 1946; Miller to Wells, 13 September 1946; and intervening letters.
43 RF Massera, HMM Diary Oct 23-26.
44 RF Massera, Sparks to Miller, 4 December 1946, enclosed in Caldwell to Miller, 8 January 1947.
45 RF Massera, Miller to Massera, 10 January 1946; HMM Diary, June 13-14 1947.
46 E.g. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Headquarters File 100-HQ-341838, sec. 01, Office Memorandum, 8 April 1947; sec. 02, Scheidt to Director, 6 March, 1948, and Lemaitre report 7 February, 1949.
If his FBI file is to be believed, Massera ranged widely over the U.S. during his fellowship for a combination of academic, political, and touristic purposes. While Massera’s mathematical contacts were unreserved in praise of his seriousness and scholarly dedication, there was not much Miller could do to verify or respond to academic matters. The lone exception came when Massera and his Stanford supervisor mutually determined that Massera would be better off studying at New York University and Princeton, at which point Miller turned to his familiar routine of logistical brokering to enable Massera’s relocation. After the fellowship ended, Miller again met Massera in Montevideo and recorded his latest academic and political activities, with the latter including a brief imprisonment.

Massera’s politics had a number of ramifications for others in and beyond the Rockefeller Foundation. Both he and Laguardia hoped to return to the United States in the summer of 1950 for the first postwar International Congress of Mathematicians, hosted principally at Harvard. They worried initially about finances, and were able to secure support for their travel from funds dedicated to bringing foreign mathematicians to both the Congress and an organizing meeting for a revived International Mathematical Union held in conjunction with it. With less than a month remaining before the start of the Congress, however, neither Laguardia nor Massera had been approved for visas to travel to the United States. They considered Massera a lost cause at that late stage, and Laguardia quickly found that his professional association with Massera was enough to raise doubts about his own ideology for the American Consul in Montevideo. Indeed, Miller had learned as early as 1948 that the U.S. ambassador in Montevideo considered the two Uruguayan mathematicians to be politically linked. Despite Miller’s assurances, the ambassador vowed to denounce any future Rockefeller support for Laguardia, and Miller quipped that his “dossier in the Embassy may now indicate that he [Miller], too, is a Communist.”

With time running short, Laguardia protested to the Consul that “I have no political activity whatsoever, [and] I do not belong to any political party or cultural organization with political implications.” Meanwhile, American mathematicians (including Stone), together with Guggenheim Foundation officers, lobbied the Montevideo Consul, the U.S. State Department, and others in order to seek a swift resolution. This multi-prong effort resulted in a visa by the middle of the month, just in time for Laguardia to depart and participate in both the IMU meeting and the Congress. While in New York for the former gathering, Laguardia met with Miller, who made a note of the affair in the Rockefeller Foundation’s files. Even after this series of events, officials in the United States government retained suspicions of Laguardia. Assessing another mathematician, Paul Halmos, visiting from the United States in 1951-52, the

47 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Headquarters File 100-HQ-341838, sec. 01, SF (San Francisco bureau) file number 100-27215, report of 2 January 1948, p. 9. Cf. Office Memorandum, 8 April 1947, op. cit.
48 RF Massera, Miller to Massera, 10 September 1947; HMM Diary 15 September 1947; GRP (Gerard Pomerat) Diary, 6 October 1947; LWH Diary, 12 March 1948 (meeting with Laguardia in Montevideo); HMM Diary 27 April 1948, with several annotations; HMM notes, 1 June 1948.
49 RF Massera, HMM Diary, 13-15 October 1948.
50 See Barany, Distributions, 223-228 for further details and background on Massera and Laguardia’s attempts to attend the Congress.
51 RF Massera, HMM diary, 13-15 Oct 1948.
52 Laguardia Papers, box 17, folder 9, Laguardia to Kline, 8 Aug 1950.
53 RF, Record Group 1.1, series 200D, box 125 folder 1546.
FBI recorded that “a usually reliable source” advised their informant in Montevideo that Laguardia—who had helped to arrange the visit—was “a reported Communist sympathizer.”

Halmos was well aware during his visit of American officials’ ongoing preoccupation with suspected Communism in the region. The U.S. cultural attaché in Montevideo, Halmos reported, enlisted him in “a little spy work, junior grade,” which involved infiltrating the Federación de Estudiantes Universitarios del Uruguay. Halmos awkwardly declined that assignment, but was later asked by that same attaché to comment on a claim “that Laguardia is a communist,” to which Halmos “said that I thought it was the damndest nonsense I ever heard.”

During his visit, Halmos reported to Marshall Stone that “From personal observation I wouldn’t know that Massera is a communist.” He and Massera would “either discuss the weather over a cup of tea, or else he tells me what were contents of his course on Hilbert space and what part of differential equation theory he is currently working on.” Halmos found Massera “remarkably pleasant” and “placid,” not prone to “spreading propaganda” but rather “the only one at the institute who really works.”

At the same time, Halmos traded tales with “a certain Mr. Miller of the Rockefeller foundation” and learned from Laguardia that the institute’s ambition “of being able to obtain some Rockefeller money … exploded one day violently when Miller found out that Massera is a big wheel in the institute and Massera is a communist,” though “A vague friendship between Laguardia and Miller continues, but with no indication of money ever changing hands.” To another correspondent, Halmos observed that Massera was “a real nice, warmly [sic], friendly guy, and quite a good mathematician,” who “makes no secret of” being “a very active member of the local communist party” but “manages to keep his professional life and his political life carefully separated.” All the same, Halmos relayed that Laguardia found Massera’s communist activities “somewhat embarrassing.” Indeed, “While the commys [sic] are not feared and hated so much here as in the States, they are nevertheless far from popular, particularly in … the circles where money comes from.” Halmos alleged that the Rockefeller Foundation learned of Massera’s communism “on a certain Monday and broke off negotiations” over funding that very Tuesday. Thus, while Rockefeller officials could afford not to be demonstrative over politics, they nonetheless acted in ways discernible to outsiders to insulate themselves from the ideological baggage of funding Cold War rivals too freely or openly.

Miller’s South American wrangling became a key case in point for Rockefeller Foundation officers’ internal assessments of programs and policy with regard to communist and fellow traveler grantees. A November 1949 note from WW (Warren Weaver) to CIB (the bureauonym for Rockefeller Foundation President Chester I. Barnard) filed under “Program and Policy – National Security” explained that “HMM has had informal conversations with some Cultural Attaches” on the continent so that he might “know in advance if it seems quite clear that a certain man would be refused a visa.” As Weaver elaborated in a later discussion, Miller’s approach to maintaining such contacts informally and with as light a touch as possible

54 Excerpt from Federal Bureau of Investigation Bufile 100-387157, Chicago, Illinois report of 16 Jan 1953, p. 15, released pursuant to the author’s FOI/PA request no. 1305216-0.
56 Halmos Uruguay file, Halmos to Stone, 15 Oct 1951.
57 Ibid.
58 Halmos Uruguay file, Halmos to Ambrose, 23 Oct 1951.
59 RF, Record Group 3.1, series 900, box 25 (hereafter RF National Security), folder 199, WW to CIM, 1 Nov 1949. I thank John Krige for alerting me to these records and sharing his copy.
exemplified a general principle in Rockefeller diplomacy, crafted to preserve their “exceedingly valuable reputation as an apolitical agency.” Where Barnard appeared to disclaim awareness of past communist grantees, Weaver was obliged to correct him by pointing out that Massera “has been very active in the Communist Party” since concluding his Rockefeller fellowship. “It remains true that he is an excellent mathematician,” Weaver explained, “but it is also true that our assistance to him has been criticized.”

In a subsequent note, Weaver acknowledged the special delicacy from a National Security perspective of supporting theoretical physics, especially “atomic or nuclear physics,” which the foundation did not generally underwrite. The exception to this rule was the foundation’s support for physicists in São Paulo, as it was “the only place south of the Rio Grande where any really modern physics is being done,” and, equally pertinent, it was in a nation then on good diplomatic terms with the United States. By the early 1950s, Weaver could cast the Rockefeller Foundation’s broader move away from the physical sciences in favor of biology and agriculture as a simplification “from the point of view of security content,” as the latter “are largely innocuous.” The FBI did, in fact, express concern over Massera’s potential to learn nuclear physics in California, and a side-effect of officers’ coarse and superficial familiarity with fellows’ scholarship was an inability to say whether such concerns had merit.

Weaver’s evaluation of Massera’s communism—that it was a deeply held commitment but did not interfere with his excellent scholarship—would seem directly at odds with the position the Rockefeller Foundation would take just a couple years later in response to allegations from U.S. officials and lawmakers that they had knowingly supported communist individuals and institutions. Replying to the Cox Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, Rockefeller officers couched their approach to communist scientists in terms of their commitment to “sound, scholarly scientific procedure” and “objectivity” which they asserted communists, as such, “cannot be trusted” to maintain. They noted their “informal and confidential” practice of inquiring into foreign candidates, which they tied to their “status as a private nonpolitical organization.” Any further ideological test, they asserted, risked denying “the importance of the non-conformist in the advancement of human thought,” which “is the antithesis of Communism.” Objectivity alone would be a sufficient safeguard against “totalitarian ideology.”

How can one square this with the foundation’s own assessment of Massera? A case could be made that, while clearly a communist, Massera did not fit the totalitarian model on which the foundation’s Cox Committee defense was premised. Nor, for that matter, would many Soviet scientists. The foundation assembled digest files on everyone who could possibly be construed as suspicious by the committee, including Massera, Laguardia, and Catunda, and found each funding decision defensible one way or another. Adopting the committee’s sweeping caricature

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60 RF National Security, folder 200, WW to CIB and LFK [Vice President Lindsley F. Kimball], 6 Feb 1952.
61 WW to CIM, 1 Nov 1949, op. cit.
62 RF National Security, folder 199, WW to CIB, 4 Jan 1950.
63 WW to CIB and LFK, 6 Feb 1952, op cit.
65 RF, Record Group 3.2, series 900, box 14, folder 89, pp. 46-48, 55.
66 RF, Cox and Reece Investigations (FA418), series 1.1.
of communism gave room to excuse or explain away the foundation’s embrace of individual
communist and fellow traveler grantees.

A more complete account of the foundation’s apparent inconsistency, however, can be
rooted in the plural subject positions we have come to recognize in Miller’s fellowship
administration, reflected and recapitulated here in broader Rockefeller Foundation policy
discussions. Politics and ideology, here, are safely confined to informal and bureaunymic
exchanges. These back-room acknowledgements of contradiction and complexity enabled
officials to adopt formal claims on the foundation’s behalf that advanced the foundation’s
interests without compromising its ability to maneuver behind the scenes. Here, the continuity
of the foundation’s interwar bureaucratic practice and sociability strongly tempered discontinuities
in the political and ideological environments in which officers operated. Each formal assertion
that communism cannot enter into Rockefeller programs is coupled, in the Cox responses, with
an assertion of the foundation’s prerogatives to operate informally and without rigid ideological
guideposts—to entertain the participation of potential communists so long as their communism
stayed out of the foreground.

**Conclusions**
The foregoing tripartite analysis of Harry Miller’s Rockefeller Foundation work hinges not on
the possibility of a rigorous division of roles and selves but on a recognition of the constant
mutual imbrication of figures that are nonetheless distinguishable. Executing Massera’s
fellowship, Miller operated at different points as the formal Dr. Miller, the informal Dusty, and
the behind-the-scenes bureaucrat HMM, adopting each posture according to the relationships and
dictates of the situation at hand. Consider all that these plural voices bound together: Miller
undertook both formal and informal contacts at institutions in North and South America,
advocated across government and consular offices in multiple countries, and coordinated
interventions by officials from multiple Rockefeller offices and operations. The work of
fellowship administration required intercontinental travel by Miller and international travel by
Wells and Hackett, and built as well on the travels of Laguardia, Stone, and others. Political
questions blended into logistical questions which merged with intellectual and institutional
questions. Even when nearly everyone supported the fellowship, one recalcitrant entity (in this
case, those in the Montevideo Consulate that reneged on Massera’s visa) rippled across every
layer of negotiation and organization.

Massera’s fellowship arrangements were complicated, but one should not lose sight of
the fact that they had a particular form of complication, one that speaks as well to the many
fellowships that ran without incident. His complexities reverberated through a diplomatic-
administrative network that was mostly well-adapted to accommodate political and economic
obstacles and ambiguities. But that network had its own less-visible weaknesses and blind spots.
Rockefeller officers had little control over or ability to adjudicate Massera’s scholarly activities
as a fellow. Their reliance on informal assessments of potential barriers to his fellowship meant
that they were late to recognize the consequences of Massera’s political commitments and
activities. Other particularities had to do with who Massera was: his combination of youth,
enterprise, financial and family stability, and other affordances allowed him to gain notice and
weather delays and complications in ways that other prospective fellows could not.

Though Rockefeller programs in the natural sciences and mathematics waned in the
1950s, they helped set a model and laid a personal and institutional infrastructure that other
organizations—including UNESCO, the Guggenheim Foundation, and the Fulbright
Commission—would continue well into the latter half of the twentieth century, with resources and objectives that combined earlier philanthropic models with new structures and prerogatives of the Cold War. The Rockefeller Foundation, moreover, played a pivotal early part in identifying and reinforcing a scientific elite in and beyond South America whose foreign training and connections and institutional wherewithal assured them ongoing authority in their respective locales. The lasting effects of Rockefeller institutional arrangements make their administrative idiosyncrasies all the more pertinent. Officers’ means of gathering information for programs and fellowships created a feedback loop where those who were better connected to the organization had more opportunities to reinforce and build upon those connections. Institutional elites who, by chance or design, had the kinds of international connections that placed them in the Foundation’s orbit could turn their Rockefeller ties into substantial material and institutional resources.

Harry Miller used his ability to win friends and maintain informal scholarly networks to lay a broad groundwork for Cold War transnational science. Informal relationships let him broker travel and exchanges that reached far beyond what he managed through formal channels alone. While the Cold War changed many formal diplomatic practices and considerations, it left these vital informal means comparatively unaltered. It therefore mattered tremendously who got to be Miller’s friend, or whose sociabilities were compatible or incompatible with his. He wove far-reaching bureaucratic infrastructures with circulating memoranda and reports, and the interlocutors of HMM shaped programs and policies at great distances. All the while, he spoke for and established the place of a towering foundation: his formal address marshalled resources, made careers, and guided institutions.

The lesson of this analysis for the transnational history of science is, at its most basic, that borders are always crossed multifariously. For Massera and other fellows to travel as they did, a large volume of papers and a large number of other people had to travel between countries and institutions many times over. Those like Miller crossed borders by both formal and informal routes; they amassed and deployed other border crossings through bureaucratic amalgamations that were never simply records of crossings past. As they moved between nations, they never moved as just one subjectively singular and coherent person: the dual of crossing is splitting. Even bilateral exchanges built on extensive multilateral flows of people, paper, and resources. Teasing apart the plural subjective faces of these interactions can illuminate the occluded operation of power, the improvisation and contingency, and the reverberating connections that underwrote transnational endeavors.

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